Ridiculous DARA and Maximum Pashtunistan

Submitted by Bird Dog on Fri, 11/21/2008 - 1:44pm.

I don't doubt that the delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid to "crisis zone" countries can come with political and military strings attached, but the example cited in this Washington Post article is ridiculous:

For instance, the United States and its NATO partners channel much of their aid dollars in Afghanistan through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), military groups that oversee military and civilian activities in the country's conflict zones. The report said that placing NATO forces in charge of some relief and development operations has "blurred" the line between civilian and military activities, threatening to expose humanitarian aid workers to attacks by Taliban militants.

The ridiculousness is multi-layered. First is the apparent assumption that humaritarian aid can be effectively delivered to these hot spots without military assistance and without adequate security. In areas where chaos and insurgency reign, how does this happen? Second is DARA's affontery that American forces (instead of civilians) are aiding in delivering humanitarian assistance. Why should it matter who delivers when the more important matter is that it gets delivered? There are areas in Afghanistan where the only means for aiding the populace is via PRTs. I suppose DARA would rather have the aid delivered by "impartial" civilians to unstable areas and have warlords and Talibaners abscond with these goods.

This sounds more like a pissy turf battle than a useful report, and it sounds a little like the kerfuffle last year when several academics criticized the group of anthropologists who contributed to the COIN manual and consulted the military on Iraq. It wasn't so much what those anthropologists did, it was who they did it with. The thinking, apparently, is that any interaction or cooperation with the military is a taint on the purity of their efforts.

Speaking of Afghanistan, the folks at Small Wars Journal have reproduced an article on how a counterinsurgency campaign can be implemented. Afghanistan is more rural than Iraq and is organized at the tribal and district levels. The authors propose a more permanent and persistent presence along the Highway 1 corridor (which is where Taliban attacks are concentrated) and along key border areas. They propose increased indigenous forces and increased American embedding with those forces. The recommended surge of eight brigades would be substantial, adding 25,000 to 40,000 troops, and would be complemented by increased numbers of interagency personnel, thereby enhancing humanitarian and political efforts.
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"I want America to know that I'm, like, totally ready to lead." -- Paris Hilton

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Well, the article is about US development aid (#137672)

by mmghosh on Fri, 11/21/2008 - 5:23pm

by the US government, which is usually expected to be enhancing broad US government policy in most cases.

Also, and a little OT, according to
Wikipedia

The United States is the world's largest contributor of ODA in absolute terms ($15.7 billion, 2003), but the smallest among developed countries as a percentage of its GDP (0.14% in 2003).

Not to forget the kind of people that some of this the aid went to, historically e.g. Mobutu Sese Seko. I work in this sector, and my view is that private US charities do a great deal more worthwhile work. I must except the old USIS which was a great ambassador for the US, US government Cold War bias notwithstanding.

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I see your point, and its reasonably sound at first glance. (#137650)

by BlaiseP on Fri, 11/21/2008 - 2:52pm

But allow me to add a few wrinkles, not direct contradiction.

Blurring the line between humanitarian work and military objectives is dangerous for the humanitarian. For this reason, the Red Cross and Red Crescent were invented. Yes, I know Red Crescent ambulances have been used to transport terrorists in Lebanon, few better. That's exactly why I never go into a refugee camp armed. I go in with a bodyguard and a liaison from the camp powers-that-be.

Yes, it's dangerous to go in to do humanitarian work in a war zone. But it can't be commingled with military: once that happens, the humanitarian becomes part and parcel of the military in the eyes of the refugees, I've seen it. The Russians tried this and it didn't work. If the military wants to its own humanitarian work, fine. They need to do such work. If it's too dangerous, get the NGOs out, they'll go. But don't commingle them.

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Basically, (#137620)

by Punditus Maximus on Fri, 11/21/2008 - 1:52pm

we should do what we would have done if we the guy you said we should have voted for in 2000, 2004, and 2008 wasn't in charge.

I suspect we will, since we didn't this time.

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

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Circumstances changed (#137625)

by Bird Dog on Fri, 11/21/2008 - 2:03pm

When Musharraf started negotiating ceasefires and treaties with leaders in the frontier provinces, the situation in Afghanistan worsened in the wake of those agreements. The guy in 2008 (McCain) actually proposed a COIN strategy. The guy who was elected instread will still not even name it, so your comment has no merit.

"I want America to know that I'm, like, totally ready to lead." -- Paris Hilton

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