Capitalizing on the success of the "Surge"?


I just read a great opinion piece written by Andrew J. Bacevich which appears in The American Conservative magazine. (full article here) Mr. Bacevich is a frequent critic of the Iraq War, a professor of history and international relations at Boston University and a retired U.S. Army Colonel. In the article Mr. Bacevich's takes General Petraeus to task for buying time for the Bush Administration, Congressional Republicans, and Congressional Democrats. While doing this he brings up the best point I have heard yet in regard to Petraeus' testimony:

...Let us assume instead that Petraeus genuinely believes that he has broken the code in Iraq and that things are improving. Let’s assume further that he is correct in that assessment.

What then should he have recommended to the Congress and the president? That is, if the commitment of a modest increment of additional forces —the 30,000 troops comprising the surge, now employed in accordance with sound counterinsurgency doctrine —has begun to turn things around, then what should the senior field commander be asking for next?

A single word suffices to answer that question: more. More time. More money. And above all, more troops.

It is one of the oldest principles of generalship: when you find an opportunity, exploit it. Where you gain success, reinforce it. When you have your opponent at a disadvantage, pile on. In a letter to the soldiers serving under his command, released just prior to the congressional hearings, Petraeus asserted that coalition forces had “achieved tactical momentum and wrestled the initiative from our enemies.” Does that reflect his actual view of the situation? If so, then surely the imperative of the moment is to redouble the current level of effort so as to preserve that initiative and to deny the enemy the slightest chance to adjust, adapt, or reconstitute.

Yet Petraeus has chosen to do just the opposite. Based on two or three months of (ostensibly) positive indicators, he has advised the president to ease the pressure, withdrawing the increment of troops that had (purportedly) enabled the coalition to seize the initiative in the first place.

I am sure the "Surge" defenders will find a way to dismiss this criticism but I haven't yet been able to. If the US military truly have the insurgents and AQI on the run in Iraq then why is the General in charge proposing we reduce the number of troops there? I think I know the answer to that and it has a lot to do with the fact that there just aren't enough troops available to sustain the surge and little to do with the Surge's success.

I highly recommend reading the whole article. In it, Mr. Bacevich shines a light on General Petraeus that reveals quite a bit about the General's decisions regarding his Congressional testimony. If we truly want to win in Iraq it is time we started talking about the true cost of winning. I don't think we, as a nation, will have that conversation while Bush is in office. After reading Mr. Bacevich's article I don't think we will have that conversation while General Petraeus is in the spotlight either.
--

But she's a queen, and such are queens

that your laughter is sucked in their brains. -D. Bowie

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Bacevich doesn't say it here, (#61283)
by Bird Dog

but he's been a longtime opponent of our going into Iraq and longtime critic of the war effort. In addition, he lost a son in Iraq.

If I understand his position correctly, he believes we should get of Iraq so we can fight the war on terror where the terrorists are. However, he fails to acknowledge that al Qaeda has a significant presence in Iraq. The terrorists brought the war on terror to this country, so by his own logic, we would violate his own strategy by leaving, especially since his own son was killed by an al Qaeda suicide bomber.

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"I want America to know that I'm, like, totally ready to lead." -- Paris Hilton

No, the US brought the war on terror to this country (#61287)
by HankP

can't you even admit the obvious anymore?

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I blame it all on the Internet

Obvious when your thinking is blindered (#61320)
by Bird Dog

You and so many other liberals fail to recognize that al Qaeda had a choice, and you're absolving al Qaeda of its responsibility. We didn't make them go there. They used their own free will and made Iraq a central front. Where we messed up was in the poor post-war planning, allowing chaos and giving them the opportunity to go in.

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"I want America to know that I'm, like, totally ready to lead." -- Paris Hilton

The US had a choice too (#61341)
by HankP

we chose ... poorly. We also forgot that one of the classic blunders is to get involved in a land war in Asia.

Step 1: Shock and awe. Roll in, destroy the army, seize the capital and throw down the government.

Step 2: Disband the ruling party, disband the army.

Step 3: Fail to secure the borders or the massive amounts of munitions in country.

Step 4: Support different groups and appear to switch support from one group to the other depending on the current political situation.

I can think of about 40 countries off the top of my head (including all of the countries in the ME) where this is a recipe for chaos and terrorism. Everybody has choices, but we pushed the first domino. To say that we're not responsible because things turned out so badly is willful blindness.

I see the same thing happening on a smaller scale in business and personal lives everyday, it's based on a blind desire for something and an inability or refusal to think things through. The problem is not only that Iraq is a mess, but we screwed up our chance to actually do things correctly in Afghanistan. Now we have two tarpits to deal with instead of one.

And you call me blindered! I have no problem seeing what's in front of me. Isn't it time for another faux outrage from moveon.org?

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I blame it all on the Internet

And what you and so many conservatives... (#61336)
by Punditus Maximus

...fail to recognize is that Al Qaeda's choice was entirely predictable, the expected outcome of the invasion, and not some sort of morally horrifying and unexpected thing.

We have an enemy in Al Qaeda. Conservative strategy has been, thus far, to give that enemy as much power to harm us as possible. I attribute this to two things: 1) gross stupidity, and 2) the desire to use an invasion as a political tool against the domestic political enemies of Bush, the Republican Party, and the conservative movement as a whole. Afghanistan was not enough, precisely because it was popular, successful, and widely supported. The point was to start a divisive (and not particularly justified) war, so that the opponents of the war could be painted as in opposition to American interests.

It's the New McCarthyism. Members of the Conservative movement who are too decent to consider the Iraq invasion a part of this are profoundly deluded as to the nature of their leadership, a fact which the leadership consistently counts on.

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It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

I shudder to think (#61345)
by Spartacvs

how the right would have behaved if 9/11 had happened on Clinton's watch. I'm sure the divisiveness of the past few years under Bush would have seemed pretty minor in comparison.

GW got a free pass from the citizens of this country in the immediate wake of 9/11 and from much of the world including many of our traditional opponents, and he blew it comprehensively.

The sandbagging of Bush with that question about Musharraf turned out to be quite prophetic after all.

Never again.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Our strategy (#61329)
by Spartacvs

against AQ should have been to limit their choices and restrict their operations, not provide them the ideal opportunity of an alternate failed state in which to work their magic, having chased them from Afghanistan. I would note that the concentration on all things Iraq has also undercut even that temporary victory, since AQ and the Taliban seem to be enjoying something of a resurgence in Afghanistan that could compromise the mission in that largely forgotten theater.

Your continuing to conflate Iraq with 9/11 by focusing on AQ in Iraq is a standard GOP tactic, which also seriously undercuts your credibility on this issue. Just sayin'.

Blinkered is the word you were perhaps looking for, and yes you most certainly are, to the detriment of every argument you make on the subject.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

No conflation here (#61423)
by Bird Dog

I don't see where we disagree that we made it easy for al Qaeda gain a foothold in Iraq, but you're going to have to show me where I conflated 9/11 and Iraq. Al Qaeda had a small presence in Iraq when we invaded, but they weren't threat there. As for my "focusing on AQ", the facts speak for themselves.

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"I want America to know that I'm, like, totally ready to lead." -- Paris Hilton

Ah. How did we do that? NT (#61301)
by Ken White
Better yet, there is no war on terror. (#61296)
by Punditus Maximus

There is only a war on President Bush's domestic opponents.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

Professor Doctor Colonel Bacevich is a smart guy (#61121)
by Ken White

and he makes imminent sense in many things. I strongly agree with him that both US political parties are equal elements in the problem that is the governance and the foreign policy of the US. We do not agree on some other things.

His comments in the linked article are his opinion and track totally with his history on the topic of war in general and this one in particular -- however, he's being disingenuous in the article. While I generally agree with the thrust of that article, there are some anomalies in it that merit scrutiny. At one point he says:

"A single word suffices to answer that question: more. More time. More money. And above all, more troops."

Totally true -- but -- he elides a critical point of which he is totally aware. In 1942, then Major general George S. Patton Jr. was at Camp Irwin training a Division to go to North Africa. He was called to the War Department and told he was being elevated to command the operation. Shortly, a Plans Officer went to see General George C. Marshall and told him "General Patton said he needs more troops, more equipment and more time or it cannot be done." Marshall looked up and said "Tell General Patton to return to California and continue training, we'll give the job to someone else." Very quickly, Patton was talking to Marshall and accepting the mission -- with the Troops available.

The point, of course is that Generals have egos and that they hate to refuse missions, no matter how difficult. Sixty years later, Tommy Franks got caught in the same trap. Five years after that, so did Petraeus. Bacevich knows that...

The North Africa operation, BTW, was woefully screwed up; as in Iraq, an Army not prepared for what it would confront fumbled a lot of things -- Patton included.

Any military operation is constrained by a number of factors; most critical are Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available and Time (METT-T). The mission is prescribed by the civilian leadership, the enemy is wild card, the terrain is what it is and one has to live with it, troops available are always subject to many limiting factors and the time is generally a political construct, not a military one -- and Bacevich is aware of all that.

He also said:

"This defies logic. It’s as if two weeks into the Wilderness Campaign, Grant had counseled Lincoln to reduce the size of the Army of the Potomac. Or as if once Allied forces had established the beachhead at Normandy, Eisenhower had started rotating divisions back stateside to ease the strain on the U.S. Army."

Supremely disingenuous; Bacevich knows, as Blue Neponset pointed out -- there are no more troops unless the Army is totally committed to Iraq -- and he knows that is not going to happen much as he wishes it would. Both parties will rebel at that thought and Bacevich knows as all of us should that much of what goes on in Congress is not about the Troops or even Iraq -- it's about the 2008 elections.

Further from the Article:

"Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli is one officer keen to confront rather than ignore that contradiction. In an article appearing in the current issue of the journal Military Review, General Chiarelli writes:

"The U.S. as a Nation—and indeed most of the U.S. Government—has not gone to war since 9/11. Instead the departments of Defense and State (as much as their modern capabilities allow) and the Central Intelligence Agency are at war while the American people and most the other institutions of national power have largely gone about their normal business.""

I'd go a step further -- the US has not been at war since 1945. General Chiarelli's (one of the really good guys, BTW) statement applies just as well to Korea and Viet Nam with only the caveat that due to the draft that existed on both those wars there was very slightly more Mr. & Mrs. America involvement -- but not one ounce more involvement by the US Government (to include the Pentagon...) or the nation as an entity. Bacevich knows that as well.

In short, it's not a bad article but it's beautifully tailored to make his long standing points on governance and the use of force. I think his conclusion is overly pejorative and unproven -- and I'm not a Petraeus fan.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

North Africa was necessary (#61171)
by Spartacvs

and had to be done with the resources available, Iraq did not.

I think his central point that Petraeus is a political general is correct. Petraeus was not willing to put the Commander in Chief on the spot, and delivered a political briefing rather than a true military assessment to the assembled luminaries in Congress and the nation watching at home, comprised essentially of what Bush wanted them to hear.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Actually, it wasn't. The Brits had whipped Rommel and he was (#61178)
by Ken White

headed west as fast as he could go and they were right on his tail. Had they not been, the Kasserine Pass fiasco would've been worse for us. The Brits were capable of and wanted to handle it themselves; many resented our intrusion. We went to North Africa for both domestic political and international (show the Brits who was going to be in charge) reasons.

Agree that Petraeus is more politician than General. that being said, the rest of your comment follows.

I agreed with the thrust of Bacevich's article; just think he was advancing his own pet rocks. As we all do... :)

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The K Codes explained HERE.

Your grip of history (#61184)
by Spartacvs

seems tenuous at best.

North Africa was the 1st Allied effort to open a second front to relieve their Soviet allies, now facing the full brunt of the Wehrmacht alone. It was necessary, to prevent the Soviets suing for a seperate peace with Hitler before the Western Allies were ready to invade continental Europe, which in 1941 they were decidedly not ready to do. If we had invaded Europe across the English channel in 1941, which the US wanted to do, then we would all be paying our taxes to the German Chancellery by now. It was also the 1st campaign of WW2 in which American forces fought in large number under their own command against the Axis, and was a useful and effective precursor to the later invasion of Italy and the big one in France in 1944. North Africa in 1941 and Italy in 1943 were a steady progression allowing a build up in experience, tactics and materiel that paved the way for the successful invasion of France in 1944.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Everything you say is true. None contradicts what I said. (#61195)
by Ken White

Thus it seems your grip of history is either far more tenuous or very selective. Good job of paraphrasing the Wiki article, BTW.

I suppose you've read Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn." Good light, popular history. I suggest also Breuer's "Operation Torch: The Allied gamble to invade North Africa," Pitt's "History of the Second World War -- Operation Torch -- Why was Britain's part played down" and Funk's "The Politics of Torch."

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The K Codes explained HERE.

You claimed the North Africa campaign was not necessary (#61198)
by Spartacvs

Which I rebutted successfully, since you now seem to agree with me.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

It was not necessary, it was desirable. I agreed with your (#61203)
by Ken White

statements about the entire western front in #61184 they are, as I said, generally correct but they do not contradict what I said in #61178, they merely amplify it.

Desirable, yes -- but for our political reasons as opposed to military necessity.

It seems superfluous but I will point out that the Brits had been fighting in North Africa for almost three years by the time we got there and that they finally had the Germans and Italians whipped -- the French would not have been a problem.

Thus our invasion of North Africa did not open a Second Front.

The Russians will also tell you that Sicily and Italy were not what they had in mind, thus their constant pressure and support of Marshall, who in a very rare miscue wanted to invade France before the time was right.

Tenuous or selective on your part was my question; I think your follow on answers it. :)

Check those other books out...

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The K Codes explained HERE.

France in '44 (#61214)
by Spartacvs

wouldn't have happened without Italy in '43 to pave the way, and Italy could not have happened without North Africa in '41. They were a logical military sequence aimed at the 'soft underbelly of Europe' not political at all,

We went to North Africa for both domestic political and international (show the Brits who was going to be in charge) reasons.

and certainly not for the reasons you claimed.

Could the Brits have beaten the Axis in North Africa on their own? possibly. Could the Allies have done as well as they did in Italy, setting themselves up for the invasion of France, with the US making its 1st showing and performing as they did initially in North Africa? unlikely.

North Africa was both desirable and necessary in the context of the Allied assault on Hitlers fortress Europe, the US wanted in on the game and North Africa was the only game on offer at that point in time. Iraq was neither, in whatever context you care to cobble together.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Sigh. Check the time line. (#61223)
by Ken White

You're wrong again. France could have happened in '44 without Italy. Virtually no elements of the Normandy invasion had been in Italy except the 82d Airborne; a valid case can be made that Italy was a major and unnecessary military drain pursued at Churchill's request because of his interest in attacking Germany from the south -- against the advice of his own Generals, the US and the USSR. It was a political decision in every respect.

We went to North Africa for the reasons I cited, not claimed. You are correct that the US wanted in on the game -- which is what I said. Torch was desirable but not necessary.

As for Iraq you may or may not be right -- too early to tell. It was, however, IMO better than doing nothing. YMMV.

Check the times.

Afrika Corps formed in Feb 1941 to shore up the Italians whom the Brits were ready to crush.

Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia occurred in June of 1941 -- that's when the USSR started calling for a second front -- after the Brits and Germans were engaged in Africa; thus Africa had nothing to do with a second front.

El Alamein occurred in two successive battles, July and October of 1942; the Germans got whipped and started withdrawing west in November 1942

Torch was in November of 1942 (not 1941 as you said); the British (who had far more troops involved than did we) and the US moved into Tunisia in late November 1942, met their first Germans in January 1943 and the Germans and Italians not evacuated to Italy surrendered in May of 1943. The British are convinced that time was probably achievable withoutOperation Torch.

By January of 1943, the USSR had won at Stalingrad and the pressure for a second front while not eliminated was significantly reduced.

Marshall and Allan-Brooke disagreed over the importance of the Mediterranean; the latter wanted it open for British shipping to get to India; Marshall wanted to not waste effort there. He agreed to Sicily, reluctantly with the proviso that there be no further commitment. Roosevelt overruled him at Churchill's request. That was a purely political decision.

The badly handled invasion of Sicily was in August 1943 and most of the troops involved arrived in North Africa in June of 1943 and they colud have come from england, though there is no doubt staguing in Africa made it easier, it was not necessary.

The invasion of Italy was in September of 1943. The troops that flowed from Sicily -- the Brits -- were a wasted effort, they landed virtually unopposed in Calabria and had to march north 480 kilometers to get the fight around Salerno -- a landing by US Fifth Army that did not launch from Sicily. Same remark as above re: ease versus necessity.

Guadalcanal had been invaded a month before by a force that travelled about 6,000 miles at sea to land.

The decision on when to open the real second front was made at the Tehran conference in November of 1943.

Torch was not necessary. Sicily and Italy were valuable only for the lessons learned that were applied to Normandy and for keeping the Germans in Italy tied down. Historians still argue the merit of that.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

It's really quite simple (#61243)
by Spartacvs

and you are throwing up a lot of smoke and irrelevant detail in order to distract from the overly simplistic and incorrect statement you made initially, viz.

We went to North Africa for both domestic political and international (show the Brits who was going to be in charge) reasons.

and the wordplay over necessary v desirable.

The US entered the 2nd WW as a combatant after Pearl Harbor and the Axis decelerations of war against us. At the time the US had no significant military outside its naval forces, to speak of and there was no theater of action on the European mainland in which to commit US troops.

The US needed a year to be able to field a significant offensive force and the Western Allies together needed to determine where to confront the Axis once the forces became available. North Africa was a logical choice for the Brits who wanted to protect the sea routes to their empire through Suez, and the US went along with it because of the strategic imperative to aid the Soviets with more than just materiel supplied by the North Atlantic convoys and because there really was no prospect of an offensive effort anywhere else, and certainly not against mainland Europe. Meaning if the US wanted in on the game it was North Africa or it was sit back while continuing to build up forces that would remain untested while allowing the Axis the initiative against our British and Soviet allies.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

You really need to do some research... (#61249)
by Ken White

No, I'm not throwing up any irrelevant detail; you are trying to ignore a lot of very relevant detail.

You're also again wrong on many levels. FDR activated the Draft and the National Guard and other Reserve Components in November 1940. The buildup of the industrial base amd the regular Army (and the USAAC) had started a year earlier. The US Army in December 1941 was fairly substantial if poorly trained and still not fully equipped due to the usual Congressional peacetime penny pinching.

I have to make overly simplistic statements to you because you seem to miss the all important details too often in your haste to play rhetorical games -- as I've said before.

I agree with your last paragraph. We can disagree over where that was necessary as you say or simply desirable as I say.

What we both seem to agree on is that it was a political decision, not a military one -- which is what I've been saying all along.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

Where you gonna send (#61280)
by Spartacvs

that fairly substantial if poorly trained and still not fully equipped force Clausewitz? bearing in mind the strategic imperative to get in the game and deny the Axis the initiative against your new Allies, Normandy? Vichy France? Moscow? or to bivouac in the English countryside?

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Dunno, Sun Tzu, you're the military expert, you tell me. (#61300)
by Ken White

While doing that do note that a similarly fairly substantial if poorly trained and still not fully equipped force left San Diego and went to Guadalcanal in August of '42 -- that's one of the 'irrelevant' details I provided you.

You might also consider the fact that the Divisions that landed in Normandy, minus the 82d, did exactly what you say -- bivouac in the English countryside.

Your grasp of history and military art isn't tenuous as I though, it's nanoscopic. You should probably stop digging.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

Are you trying to suggest (#61304)
by Spartacvs

the seizure and defense of Guadalcanal somehow indicates that the Allies were in fact capable of mounting the invasion of Normandy significantly earlier than June of '44, and without the valuable lessons learned by the earlier campaigns in North Africa and Italy?

If they were in a position to do so, why didn't they?

If they were not, what would you have US forces do while their Allies confronted the Axis on the ground alone?

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Take many standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions? (#61306)
by Ken White

If you'll recall yesterday, I mentioned that going to Sicily or Italy from North Africa made life easy but the troops could have come to the Med from the UK with no stop in North Africa -- I then cited Guadalcanal as example of a ~6,000 mile amphibious operation. I was merely reiterating that today, believing, wrongly that you'd recall the earlier comment -- but that was one of the items you thought irrelevant, wasn't it?.

In any event it has nothing what so ever to do with Normandy.

You do make some really strange interpretations on things...

As for what the troops would do before going to Normandy; precisely what they did from early 1942 until mid 1944 -- stay in the UK and train. The 29th ID, the 4th ID, the 90th ID, the 101st Abn and the 2d and 5th Ranger Bns all got first blooded at Normandy and had no Med experience -- as did all the British and Canadian units. The 82d was the only US unit that benefited from the battle experience in Sicily.

I did acknowledge that the lessons learned in Sicily were valuable -- not imperative, just beneficial.

That sitting around training, however would not have been politically correct, so the politically correct thing was done and a not necessary invasion of North Africa was launched with other troops, the vast majority of whom didn't make it to northern Europe.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

It was the institutional knowledge (#61314)
by Spartacvs

made available to the Army leadership responsible for training, directing and tasking US forces, a result of having faced the German army in direct combat, that was the most valuable. Not necessarily that the troops were 'blooded' and not something that could be gained second hand from the British who had such knowledge, unless you are talking about putting their officers in effective charge of US units being trained for combat, assuming there were enough of them to go around.

I'm used to your twists and turns when forced to backtrack away from previous illogical statements, but when we reach the point of your calling the US decision to join our Ally in the North Africa campaign as 'politically correct', then I fear you have completely lost the plot and become disorientated by your own smoke screen.

And what PM says.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

I thought you'd like that. (#61335)
by Ken White

P.M. is correct, you are generally correct -- as I have repeatedly said. I do not dispute and have not disputed the political desirability of Torch. My position is and was that it was not a military necessity. I'm unsure why you find that hard to accept but I'll fully acknowledge that there a a few historians that agree with you.

Most do not. I don't. We should be able to accept that we just disagree on the matter, one to which there is no definitive answer, without getting acrimonious. Apparently that's too much to ask.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

Not necessary. (#61312)
by Punditus Maximus

My understanding is that something like half of the US senior staff were canned after (or during) Torch; the shakeout wasn't just for the guys on the ground.

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It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

Cool! A WWII buff flame war. (#61315)
by Jordan

How refreshing to see you guys calling each other names that have nothing to do with Chimpy McBushitler or the fact that Michael Moore could lose a few pounds.

Spartacvs, I think Ken's right that the objectives of TORCH were mostly political. There was no absolute imperative to retake North Africa from an American military standpoint -- the Brits wanted to protect trade routes. The Joint Chiefs were recommending to FDR to do exactly what you say they couldn't do: bivouac in the UK and build up for a massive amphibious landing in Western Europe in 1943. They were afraid TORCH would delay D-day, which it did. Good overview here:

That said, Ken you're wrong if you're implying there were no real military advantages to TORCH, and the political advantages were real and ultimately decisive from FDR's point of view.

Military advantages:

*stop further German penetration into Vichy territory
*prevent German advances into the Mideast, the Suez & possibly oil
*keep the Med open to shipping & communication lines
*tie down considerable German resources away from the Ostfront
*securing Vichy North African divisions/navy forces as allies
*lessons learned from what was then the largest ambphibious combat assault ever undertaken
*stoke German suspicions of a Southern Front (misdirection)
*likely victory, as opposed to SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942 which could have well become a diversionary defeat in aid of the Soviet front, or perhaps at most seizing & holding a port city.
*A third option, Bide Time, would have left Axis forces with decided initiative for another year at least, and few outside of Churchill's circle could see the feasibility of reinforcing Iran or invading Norway.

So I'd characterize the military objectives as optional, though very advantageous, but the political considerations are what make TORCH seem necessary:

*Americans fighting Germans in 1942. A major consideration for FDR -- asking his citizens to wait a year, maybe two before lifting a finger in Europe would have been a hard sell.
*Liberate North African countries & secure Vichy re-betrayal to the Allies.
*Offer something to Stalin, who was screaming that the Red Army was making all of the sacrifices while the Allies did nothing. With almost 11 million soldiers and 13 million civilians killed, this would be the God's honest truth through the end of the war.
*Appease Britain, who obviously was not in a position to concentrate forces, having protectorates & forces scattered around the world.
*Again probable victory is better politically (for the leaders) than defeat or stalemate no matter how practical.

I think you can safely conclude that *if* there were a major operation in 1942, it would have had to be something peripheral to the war effort like TORCH, that or an attrition attack on NW Europe. There was no militarily "necessary" move that could be made with the necessary troops & materiel still unavailable/in production.

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Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you're a mile away and you have their shoes. -JH

Essentially what I've been saying (#61318)
by Spartacvs

That North Africa was the only game in town, because any direct confrontation of the Axis on the European mainland was but a pipe dream at the time. And merely building up US forces and materiel while guests of the UK who were confronting the Axis on the ground all over the map and not joining some effort to relieve the Soviets, would have been completely untenable and risked the strategic alliance necessary to defeat the Axis.

I also believe that:

We went to North Africa for both domestic political and international (show the Brits who was going to be in charge) reasons.

was a particularly stupid and vacuous comment that deserves the fisking it got.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

You mean the theoretical fisking you failed to deliver? (#61333)
by Ken White

What I said was as you said earlier, simplistic. As I said, that was for a reason. Tends to get your attention. :)

Note that at no point did I suggest that any attempt to invade Europe at the time was in any way contemplated or desirable -- that was one of your broad jumps. I did say that invading northern Europe without any activity in the Med would have been possible and that is true.

BTW, you failed the test. On three -- count 'em -- three occasions in this sub thread, I deliberately omitted the 1st ID that went into Normandy and had previously been fighting in both North Africa and to Sicily by saying "only the 82d Airborne..." You never picked up on it.

You could be a big picture guy; unusual in a pilot what with Checklists and all but possible. In any event, it was my little way to point out that the details are important; few of them are ever irrelevant, things occur for reasons. Failing to consider them can lead to erroneous conclusions.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

I will leave it to others reading the thread (#61340)
by Spartacvs

to decide whether or not you managed to successfully defend your earlier statements, I don't really see any point in continuing the argument any further.

Time to check weather and leave sunny Jacksonville behind.

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GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Well, I think at least one did. :) (#61344)
by Ken White

Have a good flight. Seriously.

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The K Codes explained HERE.

It was never necessary to "show the Brits" anything. (#61327)
by Jordan

They knew from the beginning they were going to be dependent on US materiel and manpower for any European invasion force, and that the Americans would therefore get the swing vote in any strategic decisions. We were there essentially as volunteers; they weren't. We could decide to stay or go; they couldn't. We had the industrial base to concentrate & supply a massive invasion; they didn't. So it was a foregone conclusion & didn't require being dramatized.

So to the extent that "do nothing or jump into the fray" was a political decision, then TORCH was political. But in 1942, it was North Africa or sit on your hands. Unless someone wants to argue for Norway or Iran. :)

--

Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you're a mile away and you have their shoes. -JH

Agreed (#61337)
by Spartacvs

While noting that US commanders did in fact argue for an earlier date for the Allied landings in France but were persuaded by the Brits to do otherwise, despite the protestations of Uncle Joe.

People in the West tend to be somewhat misinformed about WW2 and the fact that most of the carnage and casualties were a result of what happened between the Rhine and the Volga not West of it. The idea that the Western Allies could rationalize the strategic imperative of defeating the German armies on mainland Europe with sitting on their hands and doing nothing to keep the Soviets in the war is just ridiculous and naive.

--

GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

Interesting thought: (#61343)
by Ken White

"The idea that the Western Allies could rationalize the strategic imperative of defeating the German armies on mainland Europe with sitting on their hands and doing nothing to keep the Soviets in the war is just ridiculous and naive."

I've never heard or read of anyone expressing that thought before.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

A seperate peace (#61346)
by Spartacvs

between Hitler and Uncle Joe, however unlikely it might seem now today, was a key worry of the Western Allies. Because it would have doomed the Allied effort to confront and destroy Hitlers armies on anything like the timescale and the cost which they actually managed to achieve, if Hitler had been able to re orientate a significant number of the forces involved in the Soviet campaign to defend Western Europe. Keeping the Soviets in the war was the cornerstone of any strategy to defeat Hitler in Europe and it couldn't be taken for granted at the time the longer the war in the East progressed, that the Soviets would not be either defeated or that they might reach some agreement with Hitler as they had before and however temporary, in order to stave off defeat.

--

GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

I'm aware of all that. I also inadvertantly misstated in my (#61347)
by Ken White

comment above -- what I meant was I've never heard a or read of any remotely serious person expressing the belief you cited -- and I should have added that your premise that such a belief was ridiculous and naive is correct.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

My bad (#61349)
by Spartacvs

I had assumed it from your earlier comments, mistakenly it would appear, imperfect medium etc. etc.

Peace.

--

GW Bush, leading contender for worst President ever.

No problema; it is that. Imperfect medium, I mean... (#61353)
by Ken White

We need more emoticons. :)

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

I'll add another military advantage... (#61317)
by Wagster

A quarter of a million POWs captured. Perhaps not that much in WW2 terms, but significant. There's no doubt those soldiers would have found their way to the eastern and western fronts without an African invasion.

--

More Wagster!

True, you noted, I hope, that I've said that it was militarily (#61339)
by Ken White

desirable and politically necessary; just that it was not a military necessity. It might be possible that the Brits could have gotten the same bag without us or Torch ; even with Torch, some estimates are that about half that number of Germans and Italians were evacuated even though the Brits tried mightily to sink as many evacuation ships as possible.

Good point, BTW.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

You aren't contradicting him entirely. (#61228)
by Punditus Maximus

Torch was pretty explicitly the training run for the US Army -- a chance to engage the Germans on ground we didn't care if we lost.

As for everything else, the Soviets were screaming for us to do absolutely anything we could to keep the Germans busy on any front. I'm sure they welcomed Torch.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

I am contradicting him on the use of the word necessary with (#61241)
by Ken White

respect to Torch; I am pointing out some minor flaws in his overall summation but did broadly agree with that summation. That and the fact that Torch was a politically motivated operation...

Your point is quite valid -- but, again, that was a desirable effect, not a necessary one.

The USSR was indeed at that time screaming for a second front -- but they wanted it in France, not the Mediterranean; they already had their eye on eastern Europe and the Brits knew this; that's why Churchill, Allan-Brooke and Montgomery all bugged Eisenhower and the US to go to Italy and into Germany through Austria. The Brits wanted the Med opened so they could ship stuff more cheaply to India and they wanted to keep the Soviets out of as much of eastern Europe as they could. The USSR, OTOH, did not want that to happen and pressed FDR to go to France.

The US had the resources so they won -- Montgomery said the failure to go north through Austria was the single largest strategic mistake (coveniently forgetting Antwerp...)

FDR wanted British and French colonies to die on the vine and wanted their economic viability severely degraded. He did not care about eastern Europe. Thus the US tacit agreement with the USSR insistence on France as the principal invasion of Europe and turning the Mediterranean Theater into what J.F.C. Fuller called an ill resourced and strategically irrelevant backwater.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

It's interesting... (#61263)
by Punditus Maximus

...I actually have a game called "Monty's Gamble" which models Operation Market Garden.

Essentially, if the game is at all a valid model, the plan had a pretty good chance of succeeding -- in order to win the game, the Allies essentially have to implement the plan even more quickly than the plan itself called for, and they win about half the time. About 10% of the time, the Allies get spanked as hard as they did historically.

Anyways.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

Yeah, had there been more speed. It was possible but (#61272)
by Ken White

XXX Corps insisted on stopping forward movement every night on the grounds that Tank movement at night was dangerous. Well, yeah -- but sometimes in war risk is worth it.

Monty's big error was in not having the UK 11th Armored Division clear the Schelde estuary after they occupied Antwerp. That left the best available port blocked by the Germans for another three plus months. Instead of putting XXX Corps northbound, he should have used them to clear the estuary. He admitted that, grudgingly but most historians have really criticized him for it.

He wanted Market garden so he could lead the sweep across the North German plain from Arnhem. Unfortunately, neither Eisenhower or even Allan-Brooke agreed with that.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

What Sparti said. -nt- (#61193)
by Punditus Maximus

.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

You too? Tenuous or selective on your part? See #61195. (#61196)
by Ken White
The price of success (#61130)
by Blue Neponset

The point, of course is that Generals have egos and that they hate to refuse missions, no matter how difficult. Sixty years later, Tommy Franks got caught in the same trap. Five years after that, so did Petraeus. Bacevich knows that...

If the trap is that obvious why do Generals get caught in it so often? Our good pal General Ridgway got Ike to back off re: Viet Nam. Are there any Matthew Ridgways' in the US Military these days? I hope so.

When are we going to get some straight answers about the price success in Iraq is going to cost? I think that is Bacevich's main issue. All we get is spin from the politicians (R's & D's alike) and the Generals. Is there anyone in the Gov't or the Military with the stones to tell us the truth?

--

But she's a queen, and such are queens
that your laughter is sucked in their brains. -D. Bowie

The answer to the Ridgeway question is no - and you're very (#61135)
by Ken White

unlikely to see any unless there's another major war. The brutally honest smart guys do not survive in a peacetime Army -- ours or anyone else's. Note that your point re: Ridgeway and Ike has the former and still subordinate keeping his boss out of trouble; peacetime armies discourage that. Unfortunately.

You're asking for the impossible. It's not that no one is willing to tell the truth. Indeed, the problem is that many are telling the truth -- as they see it. Regrettably, the truth is not yet clear, which is why so many conflicting ideas and positions. From Early May 2003 until today the very complex and confusing situation in Iraq and the wider ME has muddied the view so badly that no one can give definitive answers.

Americans are demanding and impatient; we're spoiled and want what we want when we want it. We cannot abide being told we cannot have something, we have tantrums. In this case, a whole lot of folks would dearly love to be able to answer your concerns -- and Bacevich's, if that is one of his (which I doubt because he knows in this case there is no clarity). However, they cannot.

I can predict some times; medium sized drawdown next year, continuing annual reductions down to about 40K by 2010-12 -- but I cannot predict the costs nor can anyone else. I can afford to lay out times, if I'm wrong all that happens is I have to say "I got that wrong." No penalty. If a politician or a general does that, then the howls begin "Off with his head!!!" They pay a penalty for a pronouncement that is wrong (see Bush, G.W.).

No one can give you absolutely straight answers because the situation is constantly evolving and changing; no one in any position of authority is going to risk making a prediction that may be overcome by events.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Beautifuly put, Ken. (#61125)
by Bernard Guerrero

The whole thing. Your comment at the end also brings up a good point.

I'd go a step further -- the US has not been at war since 1945. General Chiarelli's (one of the really good guys, BTW) statement applies just as well to Korea and Viet Nam with only the caveat that due to the draft that existed on both those wars there was very slightly more Mr. & Mrs. America involvement -- but not one ounce more involvement by the US Government (to include the Pentagon...) or the nation as an entity. Bacevich knows that as well.

The % of GDP spent on the military even during the current dustup shows it, too. And damn Bush for not taking advantage to push an expansion when he had the chance in '02.

--

The ultimate result of shielding man from the effects of folly is to people the world with fools. -Herbert Spencer

Possible explanation: the new COIN doctrine, not the troop surge (#61098)
by Jordan

is the real watershed change in Iraq policy, and that's what Petraeus is hoping will show results in time. That's what he's trying to buy time for. The surge has been useful by providing a cushion while forces transition to more labor-intensive COIN duties. But it has been a grand distraction and is not really essential to the change in tactics or the modest success those tactics have shown.

More simply: the troop increase is not the cause of whatever success the COIN doctrine has achieved so far. It's just the window dressing, as well as a nice cushion for combat planning.

Bush meanwhile is trying to buy time so he can make the war someone else's problem.

--

Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you're a mile away and you have their shoes. -JH

True on the doctrine -- and the training that implements it. (#61122)
by Ken White

I 'd say the success is more than modest but that's a subjective call. :)

Bush made the war someone else's problem from the get-go. There's been stuff in the budget since 2003 that points to that. Bush said he believed he had to do it because his successor might not...

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Shall we have another round of did *something*? :) -nt- (#61128)
by Jordan

.

--

Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you're a mile away and you have their shoes. -JH

Whatever you wish to lose... :) (#61132)
by Ken White

Check the budgets before playing; look at Military Construction for 2003 through 2008.

For that matter, just look at the Embassy in Baghdad... :)

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Yep. (#61141)
by Punditus Maximus

Just another thing the President lied about.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

Oh, how so? What lie? (#61147)
by Ken White
That we were ever leaving. (#61149)
by Punditus Maximus

That we were turning Iraq over to the Iraqis.

That establishing colonial bases was not one of the primary purposes of the war.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

We will leave. We have pretty much turned over Iraq (#61174)
by Ken White

to the Iraqis -- one of the current complaints from Congress is that we do not exercise as much control over what goes on there as they would like. We will turn over even more as time goes by.

Colonial Bases? Boy, are you out of touch. They aren't colonial, far from it. Quite the opposite, in fact. Anti-colonial, more like.

Plus, I do not recall Bush saying we would have no bases there -- he did say no permanent bases -- and he has also said we would leave totally whenever the Iraqi government asked us to do that. I have no reason to doubt that.

I just suspect it'll be a number of years before they do that...

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Make up your mind (#61192)
by Gramsky

either we have bases and its colonial or we dont and
we turned the country over to the Iraqis.

Its not possible for the Iraqis to run Iraq with
military bases from a foreign power on their soil.

As for asked to leave - it then behoves us to keep a
situation so bad they need us to be in power... see UK
control of Cyprus et al.

My mind has been made up for a while. How about yours? (#61200)
by Ken White

What, BTW is this 'we' stuff; I thought you were proudly not an American? :)

Bases aren't necessarily colonial -- are US bases in Japan, Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, the UK evidence of colonization? Don't think so...

It seems to be entirely possible for those nations to run themselves with bases of foreign powers on their soil -- in the case of Germany, certainly in charge of all their own affairs, those foreign bases are occupied by France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US without deleterious effect.

So far as your last paragraph is concerned; that could happen. so what?

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

The bases are colonial (#61242)
by Gramsky

what do you think the US bases in Japan, Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, and the UK are evidence of ? but a
colonial system. One of exterting political and if
push to shove military influence.

In the case of Germany it is in charge, care to put
a date at which it took charge ?, when a German minister
could decide and enforce a policy contrary to US wishes...
tricky date to find that one with any certainty.

And in Iraq its well short of that point.

We, as UK forces have not yet withdrawn, though they
at least are not in the bases game in Iraq.

Heh, neat rhetoric if silly. You guys have a colony fetish... (#61248)
by Ken White

Colonies have their resources extracted by the 'mother' country and are effectively governed by that country. none of those bases are in nations qualifying for that -- the word you're really looking for is "hegemonic," not colonial.

Sure, West Germany, 5 May 1955. East Germany is, as you say, tricky.

Don't place large bets on no UK base (singular) in Iraq... :)

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

I take a much more broad spectrum view (#61310)
by Gramsky

of colonies - a bit more modern than the 1776 version.

A colony is a country where effective control rests with
an external power who has economic or military interests
in that country.

In the past that meant several different things from
full democratic government up to a certain level with
just military and international relations run from the
extertnal power or where everything is run from external
power and even the schools are forced to use the externals
culutre and language, laws and customs...

In the modern world having military bases creates a
substantial economic and military lever... especially
if the 'hosting' nation is relativly weak.

Its still a form of colonialism.

The decision to 'disallow' Iran to have a modern nuclear
industry can be seen as a colonial question as well as
one of geopolitical/regional influence.

Iraq is not effectively governed by the US? (#61262)
by Punditus Maximus

Someone ought to tell Blackwater.

As for resources, I hear there was an oil law passed recently.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

No it's not. Witness that none of the US Congresses (#61269)
by Ken White

desired benchmarks have really been met. :)

Nor have many of W's desires been met...

I agree someone should tell Blackwater -- to get out of Iraq at a minimum.

I don't think the Oil Law has passed, copies have been leaked and I gather that most Iraqis do not like it. Apparently it tends to go to commercial instead of Nationalist control???

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Lots of past 'controlled' countries (#61311)
by Gramsky

where those pesky locals make life difficult.

Ah the burden of the western elite...

We're rag tag American peasants; the western elites (#61331)
by Ken White

all believe they reside on the other side of the Atlantic.

I'm inclined to agree. I've watched a number of Americans try to appear elite and or sophisticated and they rarely if ever do it well; that's a European specilaty. :)

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Imagine that. (#61270)
by Punditus Maximus

We don't have to have sepoys to be a colonial power; in fact, that's a good way to lose money -- to govern directly. Far better to have lackeys govern for you and make sure that your war profiteers get their cash and the resource extraction happens as you desire; after that, who cares about the brown proles?

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

Well I'm sure you'd be the first to point out that budgets (#61134)
by Jordan

are subject to change. The lock-in if there is one would be gulf security and oil market stability, would be my guess. Well that, inertia and, um, nongovernmental interests. :)

--

Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you're a mile away and you have their shoes. -JH

Budgets do change constantly. What you need to look at (#61136)
by Ken White

is not so much what's in the 2007 and '08 budgets which will flex, probably partly true of 2006 residuals, rather at what money in the 2003-05 budgets has been spent on.

Gulf security being just a small part of that... :)

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

trade troops for time? (#61083)
by dionysus

If these assumptions are correct, and Petraeus is presumably smart enough to understand the political situation at home, perhaps he is pre-empting those who want to take out more troops, sooner, by throwing them a table scrap? Ideally of course he would have more forces but perhaps he is making a pragmatic choice between a small reduction and the chance of a larger one?

That one sounds quite plausible to me. (#61093)
by Bernard Guerrero

You take what you think you can get. If he asked for more, there's a good chance he'd end up with less.

--

The ultimate result of shielding man from the effects of folly is to people the world with fools. -Herbert Spencer

Also, (#61084)
by dionysus

Given that drawdown will start next spring regardless of what anyone wants unless we start a draft, maybe he's just putting some nice window dressing on it.

It is window dressing (#61100)
by Blue Neponset

The point Bacevich makes that I haven't heard anyone else making is that if the Surge is truly working then the last thing we should do is stop it. He hoists Petraeus on his own petard about the success of the Surge.

--

But she's a queen, and such are queens
that your laughter is sucked in their brains. -D. Bowie

Or hoist himself by barracking for something he knows (#61123)
by Ken White

cannot or at least will not occur...

Clever.

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

It's like the tax cuts. (#61140)
by Punditus Maximus

The economy was doing great and we had a surplus, so it was time for tax cuts. The economy was doing bad and we had a deficit, so it was time for tax cuts.

The security situation is improving due to the surge, time to end the surge. The security situation was not improved due to the surge, time to end the surge.

It's almost as though, in both cases, the conclusion was already drawn, and all arguments were disingenuous attempts to paint the decision as based on the presented evidence.

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

Well, if you consider the fact that the tax cuts (#61145)
by Ken White

were primarily designed to force the next Democratic Administration to have to deal with the result of the cuts...

Then consider that the surge was known by everyone going in to be unsustainable in the long run...

You're right.

Ugly, no question -- but that's American politics; been that way for a great many years longer than you and I have been around and highly likely to be for many more years. The parties rotate on who's the bad guy every 20-30 years or so..

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

Government = kitten. Tax cuts = bathtub. (#61175)
by Jordan

So nice to hear some refreshing honesty once in awhile.

--

Before you criticize someone, you should walk a mile in their shoes. That way when you criticize them, you're a mile away and you have their shoes. -JH

I've been saying that for a long time. You miss it earlier? (#61179)
by Ken White

I got tossed off Oscar Willis for saying it back in 2001, in fact...

--

The K Codes explained HERE.

So remind me... (#61148)
by Punditus Maximus

...why we should believe a word that comes out of Petraeus's mouth, now that we've established that he's a willing participant in the kabuki?

--

It's impossible to debate if people simply hold beliefs that have no grounding in reality.

I don't believe I said you should believe him. Nor did I say (#61173)
by Ken White

you shouldn't -- it's irrelevant.

He was a 'w