I'm not enthused in any way about the fall election and for many, many, many reasons. The ham and jelly vs. peanut butter and cheese sandwich choices (from my POV anyway) when all I want is a damned "ham and cheese sandwich" leave me opting to skip lunch...so to speak. But, I guess all I can do is favor ham or cheese and tolerate the rest.
So, whether you want to label foreign policy "ham" or "cheese" is kind of irrelevant in the analogy but whichever it is is the one that matters more right now.
While neither Obama or McCain have given the ideal response, Bush's response is exactly the kind of pointless nonsense that I'm incredibly weary of. Why can't he just SHUT UP and veto idiotic bills from Congress for a few more months and just go back to Crawford? My God, enough already! This self-righteous, hard-headed, bumbling, fumbling, nonsensically fruitless posturing does not serve the people he's supposed to be serving nor does it really offer any constructive hope to the poor, innocent people trapped in this mess.
And speaking of hard-headed and self-righteous bumbling and posturing, McCain seems to be upping the ante and predictably so. But Mark over at Publius Endures hits the nail on the head with his assessment of what's really at stake in this election, what the real difference (of any real consequence) is and what REALLY MATTERS here:
As much as Obama has increasingly come to parrot the foreign policy establishment consensus that has held sway in Washington for, well, a really long time, Obama's consensus view is far less dangerous than the reflexive aggression characterized by the last eight years and, yes, Senator McCain. It is the rejection of this reflexive aggression...that I view as the single most important issue this fall.
Amen.
And why? What's the problem with McCain? Well, it's something people in my neck of the woods call, with much disdain: National Greatness Conservatism...a worthless, otherwise innocuous POV, like believing the earth is some 4,000 years old or was really created in seven days, until it influences government policy. Then at that point, it can only be bad. Google it and you'll see of slew of scathing writing on it from a variety of libertarian/classical liberal sites and think tanks.
Never mind of course that this Georgia/Russia affair is far from clear or black and white and that it deserves no effort of side-taking from our government and for a variety of reasons. The front page of Cato is currently at the time of this writing awash with articles and commentary on the matter and the Independent Institute was quick with a detailed reaction on their blog.
Mark sums things up quite well about good ol' tough "National Greatness":
The fact is that the simplistic view of good and evil advocated by so many on the political Right results in a situation where all foreign policy follows the dictum "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." While unintended consequences are inevitable in almost anything government does, a foreign policy based on this dictum is a recipe and guarantor for the worst kinds of unintended consequences. It results in needless provocation of enemies or potential enemies; it further destroys American moral standing by propping up autocracies that are barely distinguishable from the enemy autocracies over which we claim moral superiority; it entangles us in foreign adventures that only minimally implicate American interests, if at all; and it ensures the ever-upward increase in military spending (and thus the national debt).
There's no inherent gain in taking some hard-line stance against Russia and with Georgia. As soon as our government does it, it's just dripping with incredible hypocrisy and unneeded potential dangers. We have no business taking sides or involving ourselves in this matter in any way other than as a neutral reminder of we uniformly stand for as country. We should not be pretending to convey some silly notion of one side being right and the other wrong. It's clearly not the case and thus no action we take should be on the side of either country nor should we be provoking potential danger or confrontation with countries we have no direct quarrel with...at least no quarrel that deserves any aggressive posturing.
The schizophrenia of conservatives toward government stupidity never ceases to amaze me....
Re: "National Greatness",
(#110087)Re: "National Greatness", something that concerns me about McCain is his emphasis on our troops coming home from Iraq "with honor" after "winning". I worry that he might essentially let pride get in the way of deciding what is best for the country on matters of war & peace, including Iraq (a pride borne, I would speculate, partly from his family history and personal background, and partly from a desire to exorcise the ghost of "losing" in Vietnam).
I should acknowledge that a good friend of mine (originally a client, now one of my best friends) who served in the Air Force in the 1980s (not in combat) once emphasized to me that we shouldn't underestimate the damage to military morale (and thus effectiveness) that would be done by coming home in defeat as occurred in the case of Vietnam.
But having said that, as with all things, it's a balancing act, and certainly it's possible to attach too much weight to that drawback relative to the benefits of ending a war effort (not to mention the possibility that further effort might not be fruitful anyway and would cost more in lives and dollars).
Note: The above is by no means advocacy of announcing and then implementing a (roughly) fixed timetable for withdrawal regardless of anticipated impact on stability, which some Obama supporters say is clearly Obama's position, and which I consider a very bad idea. I don't like McCain's apparent position (maintaining a full commitment regardless of whether or not the Iraqis make significant progress toward reconciliation and other key benchmarks) either, but if I had to choose, I'd take McCain's.
I don't know if the
(#110080)I don't know if the following has been addressed on other threads already, but a couple of questions I consider important are:
If Georgia had been admitted into NATO:
- Would it have (or what is the likelihood that it would have) deterred Russia from invading, or at least persuaded them to promptly withdraw?
- If not, would we (or what is the likelihood that it we would) go to war with Russia if Russia refused to withdraw completely, or would we renege on our obligation per the alliance, thus weakening the alliance?
- What are the implications of answers to the above for the question of admitting Georgia (or for that matter, other nations Russia may consider in its "sphere") into NATO or some other security agreement? Put differently (and yes, in probably oversimplified form), are we more worried about stumbling into an unnecessary war due to alliances as the European powers did re: WWI or waiting longer than we should to respond militarily to an aggressor as the Europeans and we did re: WWII?
If you guys have already covered this, someone please provide link to thread.
I don't think NATO would have been a deterrent.
(#110089)Partly because the answer to your second question is no frickin way. The answer to your third question, IMO, is that one implication would be Russia certainly regarding any mutual defense alliance concluded with a border state as a hostile, or at least threatening, act. Another implication is that they would look to undermine the credibility of any such pact at the slightest opportunity...and the current status of US forces and war-making political capital domestically means right now would be a great opportunity. What I'm saying is that the situation probably would've gone down pretty much the same, even if Georgia were a NATO member. Russia's casus belli isn't iron-clad by any means, but the Georgian move on South Ossetia gave them all the technically legal cover they needed.
Thank you! Vote Republican!
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parent"technically legal"? Are you
(#110100)"technically legal"? Are you saying that their invasion would be considered legal under international law?
As for your answers, I'm not so sure we wouldn't send military (combat) forces to parts of Georgia (hoping the Russians would not attack our forces) if Georgia were a NATO member. It would obviously be risky, since (I assume) we couldn't send enough to stand up to the Russians there if they chose to take us on, which would then leave us with an even tougher choice of escalating in that theater, retaliating militarily elsewhere (tit for tat) or (more likely) taking very strong diplomatic and economic measures (sanctions).
But the alternative of NOT taking any military action at all could render NATO largely moot, since its value is mainly in the reliability of the commitment of the alliance (the mutual defense obligation). That effect, plus our general loss of credibility throughout the world, could be seen as a worse option than sending some combat forces to parts of Georgia to draw a line in the sand (just as we have a small force in South Korea essentially as a tripwire, or as one U.S. soldier put it, "raw meat at the end of a stick"). Of course, that option wouldn't remove the Russian forces, since we presumably wouldn't attack them, but it would do more to preserve the credibility of the alliance (NATO) and of the U.S. generally than doing nothing militarily.
And because of all the risks to Russia inherent in all of the above, it's not at all implausible that Georgian membership in NATO would have deterred Russia from invading, or perhaps from moving beyond South Ossetia (and Abkhazia).
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parentSince Russia had a peacekeeping presence
(#110102)in South Ossetia (legally), Georgia's incursion was out of line enough to provide plausible legal cover. And of course the legal question is basically moot with Russia sitting on the UNSC.
It's worth pointing out that even if Georgia were part of NATO, the US would not as of this month be able to send enough troops/armor to credibly counter a Russian threat. Sending troops that couldn't do anything about Russia strong-arming Georgia would undermine NATO's credibility quite a bit more than doing nothing.
And of course Russia has no intention (I'm guessing) of actually occupying Georgia -- this is all a game of pressure designed to shut down the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. It's a case of Russia's vital national interest vs. our feeling of sympathy for Georgia (and our desire for an alternate Caspian pipeline).
Thank you! Vote Republican!
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parentAll fair points. I'm behind
(#110107)All fair points.
I'm behind on my reading and I don't know enough about the details re: the peacekeepers and what transpired before and during the Georgian action in South Ossetia to have a good sense of the legality of Russia's actions. For what it's worth, my sense is that at least the Russian incursion to other areas seems illegal (although I realize could be argued as a means of prevention of further supposed transgressions by Georgia in South Ossetia, etc.), and I'd guess that even the Russian move into South Ossetia was illegal, but I'm not at all sure. And the threshold of a plausible legal argument is, of course, lower, which may have been your point re: "cover".
Sending troops that couldn't do anything about Russia strong-arming Georgia would undermine NATO's credibility quite a bit more than doing nothing.
You might be right, but not necessarily. As I mentioned, the size of our force near the Korean DMZ is nothing that could do much to even slow down a North Korean attack. It's there as a tripwire and thus as a credible sign of our commitment to South Korea's defense. If North Korea attacked, they could probably take South Korea, but then we'd hit them hard. In the case of confrontation with Russia, of course, the stakes would be higher.
Re: the pipeline, how are you defining Russia's "vital national interest"? Sure, if they could, in effect, control or kill that pipeline, it would increase their power, but is that how your defining "vital national interest" as opposed to a matter of a threat to them (to their economy or security)?
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parentWith a UNSC member, the legal question is moot
(#110132)for all practical purposes. There's good reason to suppose invading Iraq was "illegal" in a technical sense -- since it was unauthorized by and opposed by members of the UNSC. But since it was the US doing the invading, the question is moot.
Gazprom's Caspian pipeline is a major source of wealth to Russia, as well as a powerful strategic position vis a vis Europe. I'd say it's pretty vital. The Tbilisi pipeline through Turkey is a direct and quite deliberate threat to that nice little stranglehold they have over Central Asian energy supplies. That's why Moscow and Tbilisi have been arguing the issue for years, and why Moscow is so interested in the Russophile Sudetenland of South Ossetia (and the other area closer to the pipeline). And why Tbilisi is spending millions lobbying the US Gov't (and McCain's campaign manager). That's why the US (and especially McCain and company) even cares what's going on in Georgia.
Thank you! Vote Republican!
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parentI saw it the first time when
(#110136)I saw it the first time when you said the legal issue is moot. Whether it would be moot or not in terms of UNSC decisions is a different question from whether or not the Russian action (or our invasion of Iraq) is legal. And it doesn't even mean it's moot for all purposes -- a nation's reputation, international relations, our own sense of the appropriateness. Heck, even a Security Council vote that was 14-1 with a Russian veto would embarrass the Russians, so wouldn't be "moot" for all purposes.
Re:
Again, I have to ask if you are defining "vital national interest" as involving a very substantial threat to economic well-being or a substantial security threat. What would be the consequences for Russia of the functioning of that pipeline? A loss of a "stranglehold" on energy supplies from Central Asia to Europe (and elsewhere) does not seem to constitute such a threat. As for loss of income, that would be a matter of degree. Do you have some sense of scale -- to what degree the operation of that pipeline would adversely impact the Russian economy?
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parentConsidering access to Caucasian & C. Asian
(#110157)oil was probably the deciding factor of WWII in Europe, I wouldn't underestimate its strategic importance. That said, competition from a new pipeline is more an economic than a security threat. Still, those two things aren't entirely separate. Wars cost money, and require energy, and can be won by cutting off the enemy's supply of both.
Thank you! Vote Republican!
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parentI was asking if you have a
(#110168)I was asking if you have a sense of scale of the economic threat. An economic threat could be enormous (meeting some higher standard for "vital national interest") or moderate or negligible relative to the size of an economy and/or a nation's wealth. If you don't know that's fine, but I just wanted to get a better sense of how you were defining "vital national interest" when you referred to Russia's interest in the fate of that pipeline.
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parentSez The Drama Queen (R-Arizona)
(#110047)Just what we need. As dumb as Shrub. But a little more unhinged.
“Two clichés make us laugh but a hundred clichés move us, because we sense dimly that the clichés are talking among themselves, celebrating a reunion." - Umberto Eco
Georgia a bigger deal than 9/11?
(#110067)Putin a greater threat than Islamo-fascism?
Did McCain mean this or will this formulation be declared not operative?
The proper balance between defense and welfare are the tectonic plates that lie beneath our political discourse.
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parentMonroe Doctrine + Manifest Destiny + Globalization =
(#109986)Bush/Cheney/McCain foreign policy. There's a lot of good will in there, but also a lot of ideological myopia, partisan agendas, incompetence and corruption. Taken all together, a very, very dangerous mix of trends in American thought.
Incidentally, ham & jelly can almost work. Peanut butter & cheese? Asking for trouble. :)
Thank you! Vote Republican!
I must strongly disagree
(#109963)While military action against the Russians is clearly not on the table, Bush's handling of the crisis so far has been unexpectedly adroit. And that's a first. Maybe it was his personal rage at Putin that brought it about. Whatever the reason, the 'Berlin Airlift' solution--flying in humanitarian aid and avoiding any military involvement--seems to be working. Eyewitnesses now report that after a day of large explosions in Gori, which has now essentially been flattened, Russian tanks have pulled back. Hopefully this is correct. There are, incidentally, for those of you still clinging to the idea of 'equivalency' in this conflict, hundreds of reports of Ossetian and Chechen 'irregulars' who had accompanied the tank columns shooting, raping, looting, and even stealing cars from Georgians inside Georgia proper. In one case a car was returned to its Georgian owner by a Russian officer. A Dutch camera crew had all its equipment stolen and a Polish journalist was shot by these people.
On the diplomatic front, this is rapidly turning into a debacle for Putin. This morning the US and Poland signed an agreement to place the ABM batteries that Russia had so strenuously opposed on the ground in Poland. On paper, at least, this is now a done deal. The G8 is meeting to debate on whether or not to freeze out Russia, which is likely to happen. Next, the Ukraine may get a fast-track Title 5 invite to join NATO. Which could place ABMs on the Russian border.
Russia has been bitterly denounced by every former eastern bloc state except Belarus, which is still refusing to endorse the invasion despite its near-vassal status. The Czechs and Ukrainians (Georgia's biggest weapons suppliers by far) are reportedly sending large replacement shipments to Tbilisi--the SAMs seem to have been particularly effective against the Russian Air Force, shooting down as many as 10 planes, and Estonia has sent a symbolic 'brigade' of 50 fighters.
As for the two candidates, McCain's 'we are all Georgians' mantra hasn't resonated particularly well, but his perceived anti-Russian stance is probably not going to lose him any votes, since those with your take on the crisis certainly weren't planning to vote for him anyway. Obama, on the other hand, has been the invisible man in this matter, and this was a mistake. Not one that will make or break the election of course, but an opportunity missed to reassure red-state Americans that he can be firm and take a lead on foreign policy. Something that he needs to do before November.
something quite mysterious
(#110028)If
The Czechs and Ukrainians (Georgia's biggest weapons suppliers by far) are reportedly sending large replacement shipments to Tbilisi-
then doesn't
the 'Berlin Airlift' solution
seem just a little tepid? Especially since that, unlike Berlin, Georgia is not blockaded and the Russians are cooperating.
I don't know about your expectations of Bush's adroitness, perhaps not as great as this guy at Stratfor who has an interesting point to make:
In this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. Georgia’s move was deliberate.
The United States is Georgia’s closest ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian invasion to justify its own counterattack?
It is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk the consequences of an invasion.
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power
Nothing resembles virtue more than a great crime. Saint-Just
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parentStratfor has a very mixed record
(#110037)Their Mid-East and Iraq analysis has been spotty, to say the least.
As for this statement, I can only assume it was released before anyone interviewed the 130 American advisors. They claimed they knew nothing about the Georgian invasion and were mystified by the sudden disappearance of the Georgian troops they were training. Bush was certainly caught by surprise.
The Georgians didn't launch their attack 'against US wishes'--they launched it because no one had bothered warning them not to--it was just too stupid to imagine.
Many years ago, my baby brother-in-law was being bullied by another kid at school who challenged him to a fight. For weeks I coached him on how to box and fight dirty. However, he lost the fight--the other kid jumped him from behind when the whole group of kids were walking over to the vacant lot behind their school for the 'main event'.
It had never occurred to me to warn him not to turn his back to the other kid. I didn't realize he was that stupid.
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parentCome on, this strains credulity
(#110153)There were not only 130 military advisors in Georgia, but untold numbers of mercenaries and other civilian advisors. Plus, the satellites looking down at the skies, presumably tracking the movements of the Russian military, and anything else of significance. As I understand, the conflict has been brewing for months now. 'Getting caught by surprise?' The advisors mystified by the sudden disappearance of the Georgian military?
Come on, this strains credulity.
Nothing resembles virtue more than a great crime. Saint-Just
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parent'Berlin Airlift'? - old enough to know better
(#109990)Who’s just like Hitler today?
Obama was firm and took the lead with his Iraq withdrawal plan and all the major players, the Iraqi's, the Bush Administration and even the reluctant McCain, now appear willing to embrace withdrawal and timelines. Something hopefully not lost on a clear majority of the electorate who have expressed the desire for an end to the Messinpotamia.
"Something I think most liberals don't understand is exactly how stupid many conservative leaders are." - Matt Yglesias
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parentWhy is Russia necessarily our enemy?
(#109969)The USSR sought to obliterate us and yet Russia makes no such claim. Indeed, given their demographic decline and reliance on petro-dollars, Russia's long term prospects look grim, recent events notwithstanding.
Is Russia more our enemy than China? Islam?
Bernard Guerrero often points out (correctly IMHO) that nations do not have "friends" but merely interests. Why then should we have enemies?
Of note: al Qaeda is NOT a nation.
The proper balance between defense and welfare are the tectonic plates that lie beneath our political discourse.
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parentDid I say Russia
(#110022)was 'our enemy'?
What is beyond dispute, however, is that Russia is Georgia's 'enemy'. And countries like Estonia, Poland, and the Ukraine seem to feel the same way. Golly gee, Bill, I wonder why they might feel this way. Any ideas?
I mean other than 'Obama good, everybody else bad'?
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parentA vague quality:
(#109964)"Being firm" by itself is worthless. OTOH, "Being firm" on keeping a prudent stance is worth something.
Yes, we can talk about "how this affects votes". But I'm talking about real consequences from real decisions once one of them would be in power...and not how it plays to people who respond to "generic firmness"...regardless of what that firmness is about.
Besides, I'm not claiming equivalency. Far from it. Moreover, I'm not looking at a scale to see who is more than 50% right. The bottom line for me is that neither is clearly right and we do ourselves no favors by pretending that one side is right and acting on it.
Also, shutting Russia out of the G8 isn't a solution nor something that should be on the table in my opinion.
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parent